How do we deal with Terrorism?

I have earlier written and lectured on the relevance of the Theory of the Just War to revolution and rebellion.^[1] This work concluded that in certain very limited circumstances, against carefully adapted criteria it might just be possible to allow that the use of force or military action be justified in support of insurrection. We will come to a review of these conditions shortly. However, since 11^th September 2001, when in response to the terrible attacks in the Eastern United States, the US Government has ‘declared war on terrorism’, questions arise over what terrorism is, whether it can ever be justified, and how it may be defeated. Since one cannot declare war on a concept, it might be helpful to redefine this statement as a declaration of war on those who resort to or threaten to use terrorism.

To be objective, one can start with the dictionary definition of terrorism (defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as “the use of terror-inspiring methods of governing or of coercing government or community”, where “terror” is defined as “extreme fear”) clearly includes the use of terror against legitimate targets, as well as against illegitimate targets. The old adage that: “one man’s ‘terrorist’ is another man’s ‘freedom fighter,’” is always going to challenge the objective commentator. In other words one must recognise that terrorism is not just what is done to me, it is a neutral term.

What this paper sets out to examine the criteria for justified resistance to see where terrorism might ever be justified; to determine the appropriate response to any form of terrorism or the threat of terrorism; and to consider how to establish a climate in which terrorism may not flourish.

The starting point of the long established Christian principles of the Just War ethical are unashamedly Christian, on the confident assumption that this reflects objective, not relative truth. And whereas Christian pacifists may align themselves with humanist and other pacifist traditions, those Christians who understand that the right to use violent force lies within the permissive will of God, in strictly limited circumstances, within the equally stringent limiting conditions for the conduct of such force that Just War insists on, cannot be contradicted by those of other traditions or moral standpoints when it comes to laying down the rules of war.

In these circumstances, then, the developed principles for justified rebellion within a state against its government are worth enumerating, since they are more akin to the starting point for those who might resort to international terrorism than are the criteria for conventional state versus state conflict. Terrorism as a method of fighting is the tactic of a relatively powerless minority against a more powerful majority:

Just Cause. The only just cause for violent resistance is defence against violent (and unjustified) oppression by the state. Injustice (for example unjust economic conditions) would not generally be sufficient cause unless the survival of the oppressed section of the population were so threatened as to warrant the injustice being classed as violent aggression. The cause must be recognized as just by independent external authorities. The difficulty will always be one of perception - what one section of a population may regard as a violent and oppressive restriction of their fundamental human rights, may, in the eyes of the government, and of other sections of the same population, be seen as in the interests of justice for the population as a whole. There is, therefore, a clear requirement to ratify the justness of the case by appeal to international bodies (such as the United Nations or the World Council of Churches) as a basis for negotiation, and to seek a mandate for the use of force if negotiations fail. The difficulties of such a course should not be underestimated. Governments of all nations are extremely wary of sanctioning any sort of insurrection in other states,^[2] as such sanctions might conceivably in other circumstances be used against them.

Just/Right Intention. The only just intention is to restore peace and justice to the whole community. There must be no motive of revenge or retribution. Just intention demands proper conduct, avoiding hatred or brutality. No section of society must be favoured above others, and no new oppressions or injustices be created. Insurrection arising from oppression of minorities can mean that tribalism or factionalism may play a significant part in the cause of violence.

Last Resort. Recourse to violent resistance must be a last resort after every other effort to resolve the situation has been exhausted, and has failed. At the very least negotiations and non-violent resistance should have been seriously attempted, even when the outcome might be predictable, and perhaps costly, failure. Until what may be a self-sacrificial campaign of non-violent resistance has been crushed, or otherwise exhausted, without achieving progress in addressing the injustice, the resort to violence cannot be said to be a step of last resort. A further obstacle, however, is that a resistance movement may experience considerable difficulty in establishing a negotiating position with the government. The secret negotiations between Sinn Fein/IRA and the British government before the 1994 cease-fire, and between the Palestinians and Israel before the Oslo Accord,^[3] show that it can be done, but the risks are considerable (on both sides). Refusal of the government to meet, and to treat fairly, the representatives of resistance movements before they resort to insurrection, could itself, if honest and strenuous moves have been made to open and maintain negotiations, constitute the exhaustion of other means of resolution.

Competent Authority/Official Declaration of ‘War’. The decision to resort to violent resistance must be made by the highest proper representatives of those oppressed (recognised by international authorities), and should be marked by an official declaration of hostilities. This most difficult of conditions needs external validation to ensure that those leading a rebellion properly represent those for whom justice is denied, and that they will remain accountable for restoring peace and justice for all at the conclusion of the struggle. There must be a formal statement of the opening of hostilities. The injustice against which they are fighting, and the remedies for righting it, should already have been made clear in the negotiating and non-violent opposition phases of the confrontation. A clear channel for future negotiations must be established and notified. The difficulty of defining lawful authority for rebellion has already been noted, and Davies points out that of all the just war conditions ‘.... this is the one that appears least applicable to Christian involvement in revolution.’^[4] The injustice should be widely recognized as genuinely intolerable, not just in the eyes of the victims, but in a broad coalition, within and across national boundaries, seeking to know the will of God. Without diminishing the difficulties in gaining such recognition, those intending to conduct violent resistance need themselves to be recognized in some way by those whom they are seeking to free from oppression as properly representing their interests. They must also be capable of showing that they represent the best interests of the people as a whole. If negotiations fail, there must be an official declaration of hostilities, stating the goals of the campaign and denoting proper channels of communication if negotiations are to be re-opened. Mott rightly insists that the actions must not be clandestine, and recommends the formation of an alternative, ‘legitimate’, government in exile.^[5]

Limited Ends. Violent resistance must be conducted for limited ends only - sufficient to redress the actual injustice and to achieve justice and peace for all. There is little to add to this deceptively simple clause, other than acknowledging the difficulty of putting it into practice.

Proportionality. The means used to conduct violent resistance must be proportional to the offence and necessary to achieve the end intended. The rule of ‘minimum necessary force’ must apply, and the rules of engagement and the restrictions on violence both have to be spelled out clearly, communicated to all those fighting, then monitored and enforced in practice. Violence tends to escalate, and proponents of a campaign of violent resistance cannot fully foresee, or may tend to underestimate, the full horrors of the campaign as it develops. Although not normally the case in unconventional wars, there ought to be strictly articulated rules of war, at least as stringent as those that govern international conflict, closely controlled by properly authorized rules of engagement.

Protection of Non-Combatants. Violence must only be directed against the forces of injustice and oppression. Innocent parties should be protected from direct or intentional attack. Besides the armed forces of the regime which is being resisted, there will have to be very careful consideration as to whether the leaders and officials of the regime can justifiably be identified as forces of injustice and oppression. Those engaging in violent resistance must make it quite clear to their adversaries, as well as to their own forces, who and what constitute legitimate targets for their violence. Every effort must be made to avoid any additional innocent casualties. As in conventional war, the difficulty of distinguishing combatants from non-combatants is evident. ‘Freedom fighters’ can only too easily deserve to be labelled ‘terrorists’ as they become less discriminate in their targeting of violence, and as they broaden their definition of enemy combatants. The weakness of rebel/resistance forces will always make the ‘soft target’ (uncommitted civilians and their property) an easier option than legitimate targets.

Probability of Success. Violent resistance may only be undertaken where there is a reasonable chance of success, and must be discontinued if that chance fades. If a just peace cannot be achieved, the additional suffering caused by the insurrection would serve no purpose. Those planning violent resistance must have good reason to believe in the eventual likelihood of the success of their campaign, within the limits of proportionality and protection of non-combatants outlined above. The campaign plan must be realistic, and should allow for a return to non-violent resistance if violence ceases to offer success. By its very nature, the uprising of an oppressed minority can see little initial probability of success – only hope! It is therefore important to have a campaign plan, which recognizes the importance of not making things worse, and has options for de-escalating to non-violent resistance – a long self-sacrificial struggle that fails, with minimum non-combatant casualties is one thing; where it brings increased misery to others, without a near certainty of ultimate success, it has no validity.

If these criteria are recognised as valid for resistance within a state, and the tools of such resistance might be to justify the use of terrorism (“extreme fear-inspiring methods of coercing government or community”) against legitimate targets (a key issue which must be addressed), since this might be judged to be the only method of righting internationally recognised extreme oppression, etc. It is difficult to think of 20^th Century terror campaigns in which the insurgents did not take on inappropriate or illegitimate targets – illegitimate at least in the judgement of the powers being targeted. The wars for independence from colonialism and imperialism, and the spread of communist insurgency often used terror against both the military capability of the ruling power, and against the instruments and people of government, but also against the compliant civilian ‘innocent’ population. In these cases, one can argue, often, for the justice of the cause and their intention, for the element of last resort, for a recognition in some quarters of the right (the authority) of the insurrectionists to declare hostilities, for the limited ends for which they fought, for a degree of proportionality, and (as history shows) for a good probability of success. Where their cause was often undermined in the eyes of neutral observers was in their failure to protect the innocent. But many a time it was the terrorists’ effective targeting of the innocent, and the incapability of government to protect the civilian population as a whole that had the effect of undermining the government’s will to win.

As has already been proposed, terrorism as a method of fighting is the tactic of a relatively powerless minority against a more powerful majority: So, it may be argued that terrorism, including international terrorism, is no more and no less than another form of warfare; and, provided that it sticks to the rules, it can be a legitimate form of warfare. The problem is that history shows that it does not stick to the rules.

The current preoccupation with the use of terrorism, and the need to resist it, highlighted by the events of 11^th September 2001, and the consequent fighting against recognised terrorist elements in Afghanistan; by the continuing bloody conflict in Israel/Palestine; by the situation in Chechnya and elsewhere across the world, make the point how difficult it is for the governments who are targets of terrorism to respond.

The first thing that must be said, is that the response must always itself be legitimate and within the internationally recognised rules for the use of force and for going to war. In these matters the careful use of words, their meaning and how they are understood are paramount. The comment above, in the case of the declared war on terrorism, that (if anything) it should be a war on those who resort to or threaten to use terrorism, illustrates the point. In the event, there are many who argue that the legitimising of the Al Qaida struggle, by dignifying it with the term ‘war’ was a mistake, and the better approach would have been to seek, as the British government have continually tried to do in the armed struggle in Northern Ireland, to treat all terrorists there as criminals who must be brought to justice, all the while being prepared to use carefully controlled lethal force in the process of defending government and civilian targets from the terrorists, and in bringing the terrorists to justice. In the Afghanistan case, having declared war on terrorism, there is now the public and somewhat dubious anomaly where captured Al Qaida soldiers are designated ‘illegal combatants’ (whatever that means) when they must surely be ‘prisoners of war’ in the circumstances (and treated accordingly). If war had not been declared on terrorism, they could instead have been treated as international terrorists being brought to justice.

The absolute necessity for governments to behave legitimately and accountably must be constantly reinforced and checked. Illegal actions by legitimate governments set a precedent for those opposing them. If legitimate government behaves illegally, wrongly, unethically or immorally, it undermines its own authority and legitimacy and gives grounds for those who would oppose it to do likewise. The classic Just War criteria^[6]are an essential prerequisite in guiding

government reactions when it considers resorting to violent force in defence of its people or territory.

It is the duty of every citizen to hold their government to account in such circumstances, and it is the duty of government to give their military legitimate orders and means of executing the task that they set them in pursuit of legitimate national interest. It is also the solemn duty of government to give proper account to its citizens of the actions that it is taking in their name. In particular it is for the church, and individual members of the church; for human rights groups; for the judiciary and many others to call governments to account. There will sometimes be a conflict between national security interests and the interests of openness, but governments have a duty of proving themselves trustworthy before they hide their actions behind a cloak of ‘security’.

Recent history, such as the actions of the Nazi regime in Germany in the Third Reich, or of the Stalinist era in the Soviet Union, are extreme examples of untrustworthy government, and ineffective holding of those governments to account. But it is not only dictatorships or undemocratic authoritarian governments that have been known to mislead their people. It is now widely acknowledged that the British and French governments acted illegally and immorally at the time of the 1956 Suez crisis, and misled their people at that time. The contrast of the US government’s openness at the time of the 1963 Cuba missile crisis is a welcome and refreshing exception, that was sadly betrayed in many elements of the war in Indo-China from the late 1960s onwards. The classic process, with the full sanction of the United Nations, by which the British Government went to war for limited ends to recover the Falklands in 1982, has much to commend it, as does the US-led United Nations coalition’s operation to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991.

Today, it is essential that Christians, and others who have the God-given responsibility to see right prevail, take a long hard look at the criteria (as well as the international laws of war), establish the facts that are known, and work out what is being hidden in order to ask the question, is the government doing what is right and in the interest of peace and justice for all in its decision to use force, and in its subsequent conduct of operations. It is wise also to remember that war is a degrading business, and that the longer a conflict endures, the harder it is to keep acting aright, and the greater the propensity for brutality. The examples are legion.

So, let governments be held to proper account, so that they may earn the trust and respect of their people and the world community.

The first problem of terrorism, as has already been outlined, is that those who resort to terrorism, even where there may be some justice in their cause, rarely follow the rules of war in the targets they choose to attack. The second problem is that of fanatical terrorists. For some the grievance they perceive is so great that they are prepared to commit suicide in the fulfilment of their mission of hatred to attack their enemies. For example, certain sections of Islamic fundamentalists, against the received instruction of most orthodox Islamic teaching, and an extremist interpretation of their religion by Hindu Tamils in the belief that their suicidal self-sacrifice in carrying out reckless acts of terror will earn them rewards in the next or afterlife, have given rise to suicide bombers seen in the attacks on the World Trade Centre, in Israel and in the civil war in Sri Lanka. All such fanatics are very difficult to combat.

For both these problems the challenge for nations facing an internal or external terrorist threat is how to reduce the threat to manageable proportions. History shows that it is rare for increasingly repressive measures by the regime in power to have the desired effect of addressing the underlying sense of grievance. Such repression often raises more extremists who are willing, even eager to martyr themselves in the perceived cause of their country or community. This is evident right now in the situations in Chechnya or in Israel/Palestine, and must be avoided in the conduct of the “war on terrorism”.

On the positive side, it must be understood that the path of terrorism is not easy. Those who resort to it are generally zealots who must rely on the sympathy and support for their cause from their surrounding community in order to operate. In other words, one might say that the terrorist “fish” needs a “sea” of sympathisers and approval in which to swim. As those who have laboured to contain or defeat terrorism well know, the key then is for governments to counteract the propaganda of the terrorists so as to win the hearts and minds of the population at large, to hold on to them or to win them over to understand and accept the rightness of the government case. Of course that will only be effective if the government case is valid.

In the film about the 1963 Cuban missile crisis, “Thirteen Days that Shook the World”, one figure, a Deputy Secretary of State, utters the question, “Why do other people hate America so much?” After September 11^th the same question was being asked, but, of course it is not only the United States that is seen as the oppressor by large sections of the “two-thirds world”. The worldwide capitalist system and the G8 richest nations dominate a world in which their own interests also usually predominate.

It is however recognised in every ethical system that the cause of peace, security, prosperity, righteousness and justice for all their people are the priorities for governments. Where there are world and regional groupings for governance and security, such groupings, currently under the hegemony of the United States, these same values must prevail. Again, governments must be called to account.

In Christian terms, Jesus’ dictum that those to whom much is given, much is required,^[7] lays a solemn duty of responsibility on powerful nations and groups of nations whose actions have an impact across the world. In Old Testament times, God, speaking through the prophet Isaiah berated the comfort and complacency of those in power, and their indifference to the injustice inflicted on those whom they were oppressing by their attitudes and actions. God’s challenge to the powerful is this:

At the same time, then, as dealing with terrorists, and their threat in a way that is legal and just, it is vitally important for governments to recognise and address the roots of opposition, from which terrorism springs. Those in power need to go back to “Just Cause”, and to recognise that, however unreasonable the cause may seem to those in power, there is often an underlying grievance that needs to be addressed. Besides perceived oppression of their religion, the poverty of the two-thirds world is a cause for much discontent that religious extremists, for example, can use to foment sympathy for their cause. Such poverty is a disgrace that could surely be ameliorated by an active policy to address it, to equip and help those who are on the outside become owners of their own future. It is not the place of this paper to suggest how this should be done, merely to recognise the duty of world governments to “to loose the bonds of injustice, to undo the thongs of the yoke, to let the oppressed go free and to break every yoke”.

The terrorist will rarely be concerned about every requirement of Just War in his struggle, but those who are attacked must hold tightly to doing what is right. The prophet Micah said that what God requires of men is that they should “do justice, and to love mercy and to walk humbly with God.”^[9] With such an attitude of heart, and also using the principles of the Just War governments can undermine the terrorist cause – particularly in emphasising the serious duty of seeking peace and justice for all. And they must not only do it, but be seen to be doing it. If not the sea in which the terrorist fish breeds and hides will continue to offer him the sanctuary from which to operate.

In summary then, terrorism is a potentially legitimate form of warfare, but terrorist rarely use it legitimately.

In responding to terrorism, governments have a duty to respond legitimately within the constraints of just war and the international rules of war, taking care not to further the terrorist cause by their actions.

Governments should seek to address their part in the causes of injustice across the world negating the causes in which terrorists can claim justice for their actions.

All, Governments and those who oppose them, should be called to account by Christians and others with the responsible duty of responding to God’s call for justice and freedom from oppression for all nations and peoples.

R Harries (1986), Reinhold Niebuhr and the Issues of Our Time, London: Mowbray

J Helgeland (et al.) (1987), Christians and the Military, the Early Experience,

JT Johnson (1981), Just War Tradition and the Restraint of Freedom, Princetown: Princetown University Press

Andrew Kirk (Ed.) (1988), Handling Problems of Peace and War, Basingstoke: Marshall-Pickering.

M Lind (1980), Yahweh is a Warrior: The Theology of Warfare in Ancient Israel,

JH Yoder (1971), The Original Revolution: Essays on Christian Pacifism, Scottdale

J Ellul (1970), Violence: Reflections from a Christian Perspective, London: SCM

E van den Haag (1972), Political Violence and Civil Disobedience, New York: Harper & Row

C Villa Vicencio (Ed.) (1988), Theology and Violence. The South African Debate, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans

L Rasmussen (1972), Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Reality and Resistance, Nashville: Abingdon Press

GB Kelly (1984), Liberating Faith. Bonhoeffer's Message for Today, Minneapolis: Augsburg Press

George Carey, Faith in Resistance 1933-45, Theology Vol. XCVIII (Nov/Dec 95) pp. 424-430

Ian Durie, Justifiable Resistance: Can the theory of the Just War be extended to opposing unjust regimes? Anvil 3/2001 pp. 165-179

[1] See Ian Durie Anvil Theological Journal 3/01 Justifiable Resistance? Can the theory of the Just War be extended to opposing unjust regimes?

[2] Even if they were allowed to do so. The UN Charter does not technically allow such judgements, although in practice their statements can give a degree of authority to freedom struggles (as in the case of SWAPO in Namibia).

[3] The current fighting in Israel/Palestine does not invalidate the principle involved.

[5] Mott, Biblical Ethics, p 189.

[6] The ‘Classic’ Just War Criteria adapted from the 1995 IVP New Dictionary of Christian Ethics & Pastoral Theology:

1. Just Cause. The only just cause for war is defence against violent (and unjustified) aggression against the state, or against a neighbour state unable to defend itself. Pre-emptive defence may be possible, subject to the other conditions set out below

2. Just Intention. The only just intention is to restore peace to friend and foe alike. There must be no motive of revenge or retribution. Just intention demands also proper conduct, avoiding any tendency to hatred or brutality.

3. Last Resort. The use of military force must be a last resort after every other effort to resolve the situation including international negotiations has been exhausted, and has failed.

4. Proper Authority. The decision to go to war must be made by the highest lawful government or supra-government authority, and should be marked by an official declaration of war.

5. Limited Ends. A war must be waged for limited ends only - sufficient to repel aggression and to redress its injustice.

6. Proportionality. The means used to wage the war must be proportional to the offence and necessary to achieve the end intended. The evils of the war, in its conduct and in its aftermath (e.g. long term environmental damage), must not exceed the evils of the cause.

7. Protection of Non-Combatants. Violence must only be directed against enemy combatants. Non-combatants must be protected from direct or intentional attack.

8. Reasonable Chance of Success. Because, if a just peace cannot be achieved, the additional suffering caused by the war would serve no purpose, war must only be undertaken where there is a reasonable chance of success, and must be discontinued if that chance fades.